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In this paper we treat an individual’s health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the 
traditional literature on income insurance, where it is regularly treated as a binary variable. 
This is not a minor technical matter; in fact, a continuous treatment of an individual’s health 
sheds new light on the role and functioning of income insurance and makes it possible to 
capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in binary models. In 
particular, moral hazard is not regarded as outright fraud, but as a gradual adjustment of the 
willingness to go to work when income insurance is available. Further, the model can easily 
encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims and the role of social norms. 
It also gives a rich view of the desirability of insurance in the first place. 
JEL-Code: G22, H53, I38, J21. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The modern literature on income insurance originates from the seminal work of Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976) and Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), who have developed models where an 
individual suffers an income loss due to an exogenous, binary event. Such an event may be 
interpreted as a health shock, which can take one of two values: the individual is either able to 
work (healthy) or unable to do so (sick). When we refer to a “binary” distribution of an 
individual’s health in this paper, we refer to exactly this case. Indeed, such a binary treatment 
of an individual’s health is still the standard assumption in analyses of sick-pay and disability 
insurance (income insurance for short).
 1 
 
When health is treated as a binary variable, it is natural to regard moral hazard as outright 
fraud: perfectly healthy individuals may mimic sick ones. However, fraud is neither the only 
nor even the most important form of moral hazard in income insurance. Since health is a 
continuous rather than a binary variable in reality, moral hazard is a gradual phenomenon. 
Instead of a perfectly healthy individual who pretends to be completely unable to work, the 
normal case of moral hazard is that of an individual who exaggerates his discomfort from 
working in order to increase the probability of receiving a benefit.  
 
Moreover, an individual’s decision to call in sick depends not only on his health, but also on 
his attitudes towards work and leisure, social interaction at the workplace as well as aspects of 
his private life (such as conflicts within the family). In addition to remaining notoriously 
difficult to observe for the insurer, these variables are also continuous in nature. All this 
means that both the individual and the insurer have to make delicate judgments regarding the 
degree of an individual’s discomfort from working.    
 
While the bulk of the literature has followed the Rothschild-Stiglitz and Diamond-Mirrlees 
binary approach,
 there are a few examples of insurance models with a continuous 
representation of an individual’s health – although limited to particular policy issues. For 
instance, Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) use a continuous approach when analyzing the case 
for allowing a subgroup of retirees to replace their normal old-age pension with a more 
                                                 
1 For recent expositions on the traditional binary approach to insurance theory, see Rees (1989), Rees and 
Wambach (2008) and Zweifel (2007). Whinston (1983) and Gosolov and Tsyvinski (2006) have elaborated on 
the Diamond-Mirrlees model in various ways.    2
generous disability pension. Moreover, Engström and Holmlund (2007) use a continuous 
representation of the individual’s health when asking whether the benefit levels in 
unemployment and sick-pay insurance should differ or be the same.
 2 The purpose of our 
paper is broader. We develop a general theory of income insurance based on a continuous 
treatment of an individual’s ability and willingness to work.  
 
The treatment of health as continuous rather than binary may seem like a minor technical 
matter. Indeed, in some respects the properties of an optimal insurance contract are 
qualitatively similar to those in the binary approach (for instance, the conditions for full and 
less-than-full insurance, respectively). However, in other respects, the continuous approach 
sheds new light on the role and functioning of income insurance. In particular, moral hazard is 
not treated as outright fraud, but as a gradual adjustment of the willingness to go to work 
when the generosity of the insurance benefits change. 
 
Our continuous approach enriches the insurance model considerably and makes it possible to 
capture a number of real-world phenomena within a very simple analytical framework. 
Important examples are the consequences for aggregate production of introducing insurance, 
the use of administrative rejection of claims, the role of social norms – and the desirability of 
insurance in the first place. Such issues are not easily captured in the traditional, binary 
models. An understanding of these issues is important, particularly in Europe, where around 
20 percent of the population in working age today live on benefits from different types of 
income insurance. In the paper, we spell out our results in the form of “propositions” only 
when our conlusions differ from, or add to, results in the previous literature. 
 
 
2. The Basic Model 
 
Let us write the individual’s utility in the simplest possible way: 
 
()
W uu c θ =+  when working      (1) 
 ()
A uu c =  when absent from work,      (2) 
                                                 
2 Outside the insurance literature, there are several papers on absence from work using a utility function with a 
continuous index variable reflecting the individual’s health status; see, for instance, Barmby et al. (1994) and the 
survey by Brown and Sessions (1996). These papers mainly deal with on-the-job shirking and efficiency wages.    3
 
where  0 ) ( ' > ⋅ u  and  0 ) ( ' ' < ⋅ u  and where  θ  is a random variable. We interpret θ  as an 
expression for an individual’s willingness and ability to work (i.e., the disutility of work), 
which depends on factors such as his health, work environment and available leisure 
activities. Equations (1) and (2) are basically the same as in Diamond and Sheshinski (1995), 
although we allow for not only negative, but also positive, realizations of θ  (where a positive 
realization implies that working conditions happen to be so pleasant that the individual enjoys 
work per se). 
 
The reason for choosing a very simple utility function, with additive separability, is that we 
want to avoid distractions from our ambition to examine the consequences of a continuous 
treatment of θ. As we proceed, the implications of dropping the assumption of separability 
will be discussed in appropriate contexts. Another simplification is that while the disutility of 
work is represented by the continuous variable θ , labor supply is analyzed at the extensive 
margin only. One rationale for this simplification is that the extensive margin is particularly 
relevant when studying income insurance which mainly pays benefits to individuals who do 
not work at all. However, it is straightforward (but tedious) to work out the model for the case 
of part-time work and part-time income insurance.  
 
In the absence of insurance, the individual’s utility may be written as  θ + = ) 1 ( u u
W  when 
working, with the wage rate normalized to unity. Similarly, utility is  ) 0 ( u u
A =  when absent 
from work. Here, the “zero” does not necessarily mean that the individual is subject to 
starvation when not working. He may have other resources than labor income to support 
himself; these are suppressed in the notation  ) (⋅ u . The cut-off point, at which he is indifferent 
between work and non-work in a world without insurance, is obtained by setting 
A W u u =  and 
yields  
 
  0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( 0 < − ≡
∗ u u θ .     (3) 
   4
Hence, the individual stays at home for all realizations 
∗ ≤ 0 θ θ  and goes to work otherwise.
3  
 
Let us now introduce insurance into the model. At an abstract level, insurance can be defined 
as a contract conditioning a payment ψ  on a random event s. For some values of s, the 
individual pays money to the insurer (i.e.,  () s ψ  is negative, called a “premium”) while for 
other values, the insurer pays money to the individual (i.e.,  () s ψ  is positive, called a 
“benefit”). The individual’s utility is  (1 ( ))
W uu s ψ θ = ++  for values of  () s ψ  and θ  that 
induce the individual to work. The utility is  ( ( ))
A uus ψ =  for all other values of  () s ψ  and θ . 
 
The optimal insurance system can be found by maximizing expected utility with respect to 
() s ψ , subject to a zero-profit constraint for the insurer, and possibly other constraints 
depending on the information structure of the model. For instance, if θ  is fully observable, we 
may simply set s θ = . The contract then says that the individual pays a premium to the insurer 
for some realizations of θ , while the insurer pays a benefit to the individual for other 
realizations. If, on the other hand, θ  is completely unobservable for the insurer, the contract 
has to condition payments on some event other than θ , for instance, the event that the 
individual does not go to work, instead claiming to be sick. There is also the intermediate (and 
often most realistic) case, where θ  is partly observable, i.e., where the payment ψ  has to be 
conditioned on a noisy signal s θ ε =+. We organize the paper around these three cases. 
 
We interpret our model as describing the behavior of a large number of ex ante identical 
individuals, with i. i. d. stochastic taste parameters θ  drawn from a distribution  ) (θ F . 
According to this interpretation, individuals differ ex post, i.e., after realization of the 
stochastic taste parameters. The reason for assuming ex ante identical individuals is that we 
want to study issues related to ex post behavior (after the actual realization of θ ), rather than 
problems of adverse selection and cream-skimming that are related to ex ante heterogeneity, 
as thoroughly analyzed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
4  
                                                 
3 Dropping the assumption of additive separability in (1), we have a general utility function  ) , ( θ c u . Instead of 
(3), the cut-off is now given by  ) 0 , 0 ( ) , 1 ( 0 u u =
∗ θ . Provided that  ) , ( θ c u  is monotone in both arguments, the 
solution 
∗
0 θ  is unique. 
4 In an earlier version of this paper (Lindbeck and Persson, 2006), with a rectangular distribution of θ , we 
allowed for ex ante different individuals. The conclusions from such a setup, concerning the possibility of   5
 
 
3. Insurance Under Full Observability 
 
3.1 Optimal Insurance 
Although unrealistic in many situations, it is instructive to start the analysis with the case of 
full observability. Let W denote the set of realizations of θ  when an individual chooses to 
work, and let A denote the set of realizations when he chooses to be absent. (Needless to say, 
these sets depend on the design of the insurance system.) The optimal insurance system is 
found by maximizing expected utility subject to the insurer’s budget constraint. Under full 
observability, the Lagrangean is 
 
       [ ] (1 ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
WA Lu d F u d F d F ψ θθ θ ψ θ θ λ ψ θ θ ⎡ ⎤ ≡+ + + − ⎣ ⎦ ∫∫ ∫ . (4) 
 
For the time being, we assume an interior solution  () 0 ψ θ ≠ ; later on, we discuss the 
conditions under which such a solution is optimal. The first-order conditions are 
 
  W u ∈ = + θ λ θ ψ , )) ( 1 ( '    A u ∈ = θ λ θ ψ , )) ( ( '  (5) 
 
From these conditions, we can see several properties of the optimal insurance contract under 
full observability. First, for all realizations of  W θ ∈ ,  () ψ θ  should be a constant, independent 
of θ . We denote this constant by –p (where p can be interpreted as the insurance premium). 
Second, for all realizations  A θ ∈ ,  () ψ θ  should be a constant, independent of θ . We denote 
this constant by b (where b is the insurance benefit). Third, by continuity there is a value of 
θ , denoted  ˆ θ , such that  () p ψ θ =−  for  ˆ θ θ > , and  () b ψ θ =  for  ˆ θ θ ≤ . For future reference, 
it is convenient to write (5) as 
 
  '(1 ) , '( ) up u b λ λ −= =      (5') 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
pooling and separating equilibria in a competitive market, and hence ex ante moral hazard, are similar to those of 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).    6
This formulation makes it easy to see a fourth property of the optimal contract. Full income 
insurance is optimal: 1 – p = b. Of course, this property is well known from the traditional, 
binary insurance approach under full observability.
5 
 
Since payments are formally tied to θ  under full observability, rather than to the individual’s 
choice of working or not working, it is conceivable that an individual who is entitled to a 
benefit may choose to work, hence receiving a “double income”. In an optimal system, 
however, this possibility is ruled out by (5). An optimal system requires that an individual 
will not choose to work if he is eligible for the benefit b. Similarly, in an optimal insurance 
system, an individual who is not eligible to receive b will always choose to work. The reason 
is that an individual with  ˆ θ θ >  will have to pay p according to the contract, and the utility 
(1 ) up θ −+  will always be larger than  () up −  by concavity.
6  
 
Thus, the optimal insurance contract under full observability of  θ  may be written as a triplet 
ˆ (,,) FFF pbθ , where the subscript denotes full observability.  F θ ˆ  is the critical value of θ  
below which a benefit  F b  is received, and above which a premium  F p  is paid. 
 
With this type of contract, the individual may wind up in two alternative states. He either 
works (and lives on net earnings 1 – p), or does not work (and lives on benefits b). This 




ˆˆ ˆ 1( ) ( 1)( ) ( ) ( )
ˆˆ 1( ) ( )
LFu p E F u b
Fp F b
θθ θ θ θ
λθ θ
=− ⋅ − + > + ⋅ +
⎡⎤ +⋅ − ⋅− ⋅ ⎣⎦
 (6) 
 
Maximizing (6) with respect to p, b and  ˆ θ  yields the following solution (after some 
substitution and rearranging): 
 
  ) ˆ ( F F F p θ = ,      (7) 
                                                 
5 The property that not only the benefit b, but also the premium p is independent of θ depends on the assumption 
of additive separability. 
6 This follows from the fact that in optimum,  ˆ '(1 ) up θ = −− , as will be shown below. By concavity, 
(1 ) ( ) '(1 ) up u p u p −− −> −.   7
  ) ˆ ( 1 F F F b θ − = ,     (8) 
() ˆˆ '1 ( ) FF uF θ λθ =− =− − .     (9) 
 
The system (7)-(9) is recursive. Since the right-hand side of (9) is monotonically decreasing in 
F θ ˆ , it has a unique solution. Inserting this solution into (7) and (8), we obtain closed-form 
expressions for  F p  and  F b . 
 
Note that  ˆ
F θ −  is the utility cost of production, i.e., the discomfort from working. Hence, 
equation (9) says that the marginal cost of production is equal to the marginal utility of 
consumption  ˆ '(1 ( )) F uF θ − , and that both are equal to the social value of available resources, 
λ. In optimum, there is thus no tax wedge between private and social values and hence no 
distortion caused by the insurance system; the insurance contract  ˆ (,,) FFF pbθ  is a first-best 
optimum.  
 
Intuitively, one might argue that the introduction of insurance will cause the individual to 
work less, since it then becomes economically tempting for him to stay home more often. 
Thus, insurance might make him more picky, so that he also stays home for moderately bad 
realizations of θ . However, it turns out that this intuition does not necessarily hold. If 
0 ˆ
F θ θ
∗ > , the introduction of insurance would make the individual work less on average, and 
thus aggregate production would fall. By contrast, if  0 ˆ
F θ θ
∗ < , he would work more. We have 
 
Proposition 1: The introduction of optimal insurance will in general change aggregate labor 
supply, although under full observability, this change could be either positive or negative. 
 
Proof: By (3) and (9), an individual will work less with insurance than without, i.e.,  0 ˆ
F θ θ
∗ > , 
if and only if 
1 ˆ 1( )' ( ( 1 )( 0 ) ) F Fu u u θ
− −> − , where  ˆ
F θ  is the solution to (9). Since the left-hand 
side is limited to the interval [] 0,1 , while the right-hand side can take any positive value, 
depending on the specification of the utility function, this inequality holds only for some 
combinations of parameters of the utility function u and of the distribution function F.
  Q. E. D.   8
 
The intuition whereby insurance has an ambiguous effect on average labor supply is that, 
under full observability, insurance only creates income effects (since the payments do not 
depend on the individual’s work decision, but only on the realization θ ). The income effect 
on work may be negative or positive, depending on the realization θ  relative to the cut-offs 
0 θ
∗and  ˆ
F θ . 
7 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, insurance thus causes a behavioral adjustment even in the case of full 
observability of θ  although, as we have seen, the direction of the adjustment is undetermined. 
Since this adjustment is only due to an income effect, there is no distortionary tax wedge. 
Moreover, there is no moral hazard since no asymmetric information is involved.  
 
The simple case of full observability already highlights a difference between a continuous 
approach and the traditional, binary approach to insurance. In the binary approach, individuals 
with a negative health outcome are simply unable to work, and therefore the question of a cut-
off  ˆ θ  never emerges. In that model, the introduction of insurance causes no behavioral 
adjustment.  
 
3.2 Is Insurance Desirable? 
So far, we have discussed optimal insurance under full observability, provided that insurance 
is desirable in the first place. The next question is whether insurance actually is desirable. In 
the literature, it is usually claimed that insurance is always desirable if the utility function is 
concave (abstracting from administrative costs). However, this is not true in a model with a 
                                                 
7 In the intuitively more simple case, u and F are such that  0 ˆ
F θ θ
∗ < . Consider an individual with a realization θ  
in the interval  0 ˆ (, ) F θ θ
∗ . In the absence of insurance, this individual will prefer to work, thereby earning 1. With 
insurance, he will receive 1 + b if working and b if not working; for a realization of θ  in the interval  0 ˆ (, ) F θ θ
∗ , 
he will then prefer not to work. Thus introducing insurance will make this particular individual’s income higher, 
which will make his labor supply fall.  In the “counterintuitive” case, u and F are such that  0 ˆ
F θ θ
∗ < . In the 
absence of insurance , an individual who has experienced a realization θ  in the interval  0 ˆ (,) F θ θ
∗
 will prefer 
not to work. If insurance is introduced, he will have an income –p if not working and 1 – p if working; this fall in 
income due to the introduction of insurance will make him poorer, and thus he will choose to work even if he did 
not do so in the absence of insurance. In this case, the introduction of insurance thus leads to an increase in labor 
supply.
  
   9
continuous representation of the individual’s ability and willingness to work. To see this, we 
define the lower and upper support of the distribution of θ : 
 
inf( ( ) 0),









     (10) 
 
We then have 
 
Proposition 2: Assuming a concave consumption utility function, and abstracting from 
administrative costs, insurance under full observability is  
(i)  feasible if and only if  '(0) upper u θ >−   
(ii)  desirable if and only if  ) 1 ( ' u lower − < θ .  
A sufficient condition for (i) and (ii) to be satisfied is that the distribution of θ  is such that 
there is positive mass between the points  '(0) u −  and  '(1) u − . 
 
Proof: Condition (i) is necessary since if  ˆˆ '(1 ( )) upper F F uF θ θθ ≤= −−  no one will ever work in 
the presence of insurance, and thus  ˆ ()1 F F θ = . In this case, the inequality can be written 
'(0) upper u θ ≤−  and no insurance can be financed. Thus,  '(0) upper u θ >−  is a necessary 
condition for insurance to be feasible. Condition (ii) is necessary since if 
ˆˆ '(1 ( )) lower F F uF θ θθ ≥= −− , every one will always work, and thus insurance is not desirable. 
In that case,  ˆ ()0 F F θ =  and the inequality can be written  '(1) lower u θ ≥− . Thus,  '(1) lower u θ <−  
is necessary for insurance to be desirable.  
 
To prove sufficiency, we note that, by definition, an interior solution  F θ ˆ  satisfies 
upper F lower θ θ θ < < ˆ . To prove that a utility function u and a distribution function F satisfying (i) 
and (ii) must also satisfy this inequality, we define the function  () () ' 1 () uF ϕ θθ θ ≡+ − . We 
have ) 1 ( ' ) ( u lower lower + =θ θ φ  which, by (ii), is negative. We also have  () ' ( 0 ) upper upper u ϕ θθ =+ 
which, by (i), is positive. The continuous and monotone function  () ϕ θ  must therefore take the 
value zero for one (unique) value of θ  somewhere in the open interval  ) , ( upper lower θ θ . By (9), 
the  () ϕ θ  is zero for  ˆ
F θ θ = ; thus  ˆ
F θ  is located in the interval  ) , ( upper lower θ θ .  Q. E. D.   10
 
Condition (i) says that insurance can be financed only if  θ  can take values sufficiently high 
to make an individual willing to work (and pay an insurance premium) at least some time. The 
gain for an individual of receiving an infinitesimal benefit when not working is  '(0) u , and 
insurance is desirable if this marginal utility exceeds the pain associated with working for at 
least some realization of  θ . Condition (ii) says that it is worthwhile to pay an insurance 
premium and hence to abstain from some consumption, only if  θ  can take sufficiently 
negative values. The utility loss from introducing an infinitesimally small premium is  '(1) u − , 
and the individual is willing to pay this premium if the alleviation of pain (“pain relief”)  θ  
from working less is greater than the loss in consumption utility when paying the premium.  
 
The proposition thus says that in contrast to traditional, binary insurance theory, concavity of 
the utility function is not sufficient for insurance to be desirable. This result is a direct 
consequence of the induced change in aggregate consumption caused by insurance 
(Proposition 1). For insurance to be desirable, the change in consumption has to balance the 
change in disutility from working. Since there is no such change in consumption associated 
with optimal insurance in the traditional binary model, the desirability of insurance in the 
context of that model follows directly from concavity.  
 
A graphical representation of the optimal interior solution ( 0 , 0 > > F F b p ) may be 











) ˆ ( 1
θ
θ ,     (11) 
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.     (12) 
 
Clearly, the curve is upward-sloping and convex, as illustrated by the indifference curves in 
Figure 1. The obvious intuition is that an individual is willing to pay a higher premium only if 
he receives a higher benefit. Moreover, the required benefit increases progressively with p 
because of the assumed concavity of the utility function. Assuming that the conditions 
required in Proposition 2 are satisfied, the optimal insurance contract is represented by point F 
in the figure, located on the “full insurance line” b = 1 – p.  
 
Thus, already in the case of full observability, several properties of income insurance stand 
out – properties that do not follow from the traditional, binary approach. First, although there 
is no tax wedge that influences individual behavior in the optimal insurance contract, there 







line:  p b − =1    12
is introduced. Second, concavity in consumption utility is not sufficient for insurance to be 
desirable. Third, although there is full income smoothing, just as in the traditional, binary 
model, our model also implies an optimal trade-off between pain relief and average 
production. We believe that a realistic theory of insurance should include such a trade-off. 
 
 
4. Insurance Under Non-Observability 
 
4.1 A Baseline Case 
While in the case of full observability of θ  it is possible to tie the size of payments ψ  to the 
realization of θ , this cannot be achieved when θ  is completely unobservable. We therefore 
have to tie payments to the only aspect that is observable for the insurer, namely whether the 
individual works or not. 
 
A person who is confronted with an insurance premium p and a benefit b is indifferent 
between working and staying at home if  ). ( ) 1 ( b u p u = + − θ  Hence, the individual has a 
subjective cut-off  ) 1 ( ) ( p u b u − − =
∗ θ  such that he will prefer to live on benefits for all 
realizations 
∗ ≤θ θ  and will prefer to work if 
∗ >θ θ . In order to prevent individuals who are 
not qualified for benefits from pretending that they are qualified, the contract must be 
incentive-compatible, i.e., the insurer’s cut-off θ ˆ must be equal to the individual’s cut-off θ
∗: 
 
ˆ () ( 1 ) ub u p θθ
∗ == −−.       (13) 
 
Equation (13) corresponds to the “moral hazard constraint” in the Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1978) binary model. 
 
Maximizing the Langrangean (6) subject to (13) and the non-negativity constraints 
0, 0 NN pb ≥≥  yields the first-order conditions 
  
() () '(1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) '(1 ) NN N N N N up F f p b up λ θθ λ
∗∗ −− − ≤ ⋅+⋅−⋅ , (14)
  () '( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) '( ) NN N N N N ub F f p b ub λ θθ λ
∗∗ −≤ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ,   (15)
    13
where  () ( 1 ) N NN ub u p θ
∗ ≡− − . Assuming an interior solution, (14) and (15) are satisfied as 
equalities; such a solution may be written as a triplet  ˆ (,, ) N NN N pbθ θ
∗ = . From (14)-(15) it 
then follows that  '(1 ) '( ) NN up u b λ − <<  which means that the optimum contract implies less 
than full insurance, and that the social value of resources (λ ) deviates from the marginal 
utility of consumption both when working and when not working. The optimum under non-
observability is thus a second-best optimum, just as in the traditional, binary model. 
 
By contrast to the case with full observability (Proposition 1), the effect on average labor 
supply of introducing insurance is now unambiguous: 
 
Proposition 3: The introduction of insurance under non-observability leads to higher absence: 
∗ > 0 ˆ θ θN . 
 
Proof: This follows trivially from the fact that 
∗ = − > − − = 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ˆ θ θ u u b u p u N N N  for all 
p > 0, b > 0.  Q.E.D. 
 
Thus, under non-observability, insurance will make an individual stay home for less severe 
outcomes of θ  than he would without insurance. The mechanisms behind the change in labor 
supply, and hence production, also differ between the no-information and full-information 
cases. In the latter case, we noted earlier that the change in production is due to a pure income 
effect. Under non-observability, the mechanism behind the change in production is different. 
First, the individual may be tempted to exaggerate his health problems (moral hazard). 
However, this problem is solved in the optimal insurance contract, although at the cost of 
imperfect income smoothing. Second, since payments p and b are tied to the individual’s 
behavior when θ  is unobservable, insurance necessarily involves a tax wedge. The magnitude 
of this tax wedge is easily derived by comparing the individual’s income when working, 
N p − 1 , to his income when not working,  N b . Hence, the income increase when going from 
non-working to working is  ) ( 1 N N b p + − . 
 In contrast to the case of full observability, the sum 
) ( N N b p +  can now be regarded as a distortionary tax wedge since benefits are received only 
when the individual does not work.
 8 
                                                 
8 The implicit tax wedge in income insurance has made the total tax wedge on labor earnings (t + p + b) very 
high in some countries, particularly in Europe. (t is then the tax rate on labor income, outside the social insurance   14
 
In the context of the continuous model, we may say that income insurance has two rationales: 
income smoothing and pain relief (in the sense that insurance makes it affordable for the 
individual to stay home when working is particularly painful). Clearly, the second rationale is 
not relevant in the traditional binary model, since the optimal insurance in that model implies 
that everybody who is able to work will do so. 
 
4.2 Is Insurance Desirable? 
What, then, are the conditions for insurance to be desirable in the first place? As in the case of 
full observability (Proposition 2), concavity of consumption utility is not sufficient. We have 
 
Proposition 4: Assuming a concave consumption utility function, and abstracting from 
administrative costs, insurance under non-observability is 
(i)  feasible if and only if 
∗ ≡ − > 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( θ θ u u upper , 
(ii)  desirable if 
∗ ≡ − < 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( θ θ u u lower . 
 
Proof: Condition (i) is necessary since if  0 (0) (1) upper uu θ θ
∗ < −≡  then  ˆ
upper N θ θ <  by 
Proposition 3, and thus no one will work. In such a case, no insurance can be financed. This 
means that   0 upper θ θ
∗ >  is necessary for insurance to be feasible. To prove that condition (ii) is 
sufficient, given that (i) is satisfied, we note that sufficiency means that 
0 , ) 1 ( ) 0 ( > ⇒ − < b p u u lower θ . We will show by contradiction that this holds. Assume that 
) 1 ( ) 0 ( u u lower − < θ  and  0 = = b p . For such a corner solution, the equality signs in (14) and 
(15) should be replaced by “≤” signs. Further, the absence rate would then be  ) ( 0
∗ θ F . Since 
upperr lower θ θ θ < <
∗
0 , we have  1 ) ( 0 0 < <
∗ θ F . In such a case, (14) and (15) imply that 
0 ) 1 ( ' ≥ −λ u  and  0 ) 0 ( ' ≥ −u λ . But these two inequalities imply that  ) 0 ( ' ) 1 ( ' u u ≥ , which is 
impossible in the case of a strictly increasing concave utility function.
 9 Thus, 
  0 = = b p  
cannot be an optimal solution if 
∗ < 0 θ θlower .  Q. E. D.
  
                                                                                                                                                          
system; here, b are benefits after tax). For many European countries, realistic figures are of the magnitude t = 
0.25, p = 0.10, and b = 0.5, which altogether add up to 0.85. 
9 With a non-separable utility function, the inequality corresponding to  ) 0 ( ' ) 1 ( ' u u ≥  becomes 
) ) , 1 ( ( ) 0 , 0 ( 0 1 1
∗ > ≤ θ θ θ u E u . Whether this inequality is consistent with a concave utility function depends   15
 
Thus, a sufficient condition (in addition to concavity) for insurance to be feasible and 
desirable is that the probability distribution of θ  has some positive mass both above and 
below  0 θ
∗. Insurance is desirable for the individual only if the utility gain from income 
smoothing and pain relief compensates for the loss of production that is a consequence of 
introducing insurance. It is instructive to compare this condition to the corresponding 
condition in the case of full observability (Proposition 2). In that case, insurance is feasible 
and desirable if there is a positive mass somewhere between  '(0) u −  and  '(1) u − . In the case of 
non-observability, the condition for desirability is more demanding since the support of the 
mass also has to include  0 θ
∗. The intuition is straightforward. Since optimal insurance under 
non-observability is less generous to the individual ( 1 NN bp < − ) than under full observability 
(1 FF bp =− ), more negative realizations of θ  must be possible for insurance to be desirable 
under non-observability than under full observability. 
 
Why, then, is insurance always warranted in the binary Diamond-Mirrlees model, while it is 
not always warranted in our continuous model? The reason is that in the former model, the 
individual is completely unable to work when he winds up in the unfavorable health state. 
Thus, the Diamond-Mirrlees model implicitly assumes that  lower θ  is so negative that 
∗ ≡ − < 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( θ θ u u lower . This means that condition (ii) in Proposition 4 is implicitly assumed 
to be satisfied in the Diamond-Mirrlees model. Another way of expressing why insurance is 
always warranted in the binary model is that in such a model, insurance will not create a fall 




Let us also provide a geometrical representation of the optimum insurance contract under non-
observability. By differentiating the expression for expected utility with respect to p and b, 
                                                                                                                                                          
not only on the distribution of θ , as in the case of a separable utility function, but also on the cross derivative 
12 u  (which may be positive or negative). 
10 Labor supply may fall also in the binary model, but only if it includes ex ante different types of individuals, in 
terms of the probability of becoming unable to work (see Whinston, 1983). However, the mechanism is then 
fundamentally different from that of our continuous model. In binary models with heterogeneous individuals, 
optimal income insurance may imply that some group(s) are allowed to receive benefits regardless of the 
realization of their health (i. e., the incentive-compatibility constraint is removed for a certain group). In other 
words, certain groups of individuals may be allowed to withdraw completely from the labor market. Indeed, 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) show that it may be optimal to lift the moral-hazard constraint for the elderly. In 
contrast, in our continuous model, the incentives to supply labor are reduced for everyone.   16
taking the incentive-compatibility constraint (13) into account, and making appropriate 





















.     (16) 
 
Although it looks similar to (12) (with  F θ ˆ  replaced by 
∗ θ ), equation (16) describes a different 
function in the (p, b) plane since 
∗ θ  is endogenous. Since the marginal utility of consumption 
is always positive, the indifference curve is again upward-sloping in the (p, b) plane for all 
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ π .
11 While the slope of the indifference curve is thus unambiguous, its curvature is 
not. Indeed, the indifference curves may have both concave and convex segments (although 
we have chosen to depict a well-behaved convex curve in Figure 2).
12 
 





                                                 
11 This also holds for the case of a non-separable utility function. 
12 This property contrasts with the strict convexity of the indifference curves in the full-information case (13). 
The observation that indifference curves in insurance models may contain both concave and convex segments 
has been made earlier in a different analytical framework; cf. Stiglitz (1983) and Arnott (1992). 
Full insurance 
line:  p b − =1  




constraint   17












θ ,     (17) 
 
with 
∗ θ  given by (13). Rather than a straight line as in Figure 1, the budget constraint (17) 
forms a non-linear curve in the (p, b) plane. Such a curve necessarily passes through the 
origin (p = 0, b = 0), since that point trivially satisfies (17). As will be explained below, it is 
reasonable to assume that the curve forms a well-behaved “Laffer-type” curve as in Figure 2. 
We have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5: For all distributions for which  )) ( 1 /( ) ( θ θ F F −  is convex in θ , the insurer’s 
budget constraint under non-observability is a single-peaked curve in the (p, b) plane. 
 
Proof: Write expression (17) as  p F F b = − ⋅
∗ ∗ )) ( 1 /( ) ( θ θ . The right-hand side of this 
equation is a linear, positively sloped function of p. If the left-hand side is a convex, 
positively sloped function of p, the two functions can intersect at most twice. Thus, for a 
given b, the equation can have at most two roots p. A sufficient condition for this to hold is 
that 
∗ θ  is an increasing, convex function of p (which is obviously the case) and that 
)) ( 1 /( ) (
∗ ∗ − θ θ F F  is an increasing, convex function of 
∗ θ .   Q. E. D. 
 
Is it then reasonable to assume that  )) ( 1 /( ) (
∗ ∗ − θ θ F F  is convex? In fact, this ratio, which in 
the statistical literature is often called the odds function (the logarithm of which is the logit 
function), is convex for a wide class of distributions. This is easily shown analytically for the 
rectangular distribution. Using a wide range of parameter values, it also holds in our 
numerical simulations for a number of other distributions, such as the normal, log-normal, 
Weibull etc. distributions.
13 Thus, the zero-profit constraint normally forms a well-behaved 
Laffer curve as in Figure 2.
14  
 
                                                 
13 However, it does not hold for all distributions. An example where it does not hold is Student’s t distribution 
with less than one “degree of freedom”, i.e., with thick tails and an infinite mean. 
14 In the case of a distribution function  ) (θ F  where the support has a limited domain (for instance, with a 
rectangular distribution), the Laffer curve intersects the horizontal axis at a finite value of p > 0, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. In the case of an unlimited domain (for instance, with the normal distribution), the curve instead 
approaches the horizontal axis asymptotically.   18
In summary, a continuous treatment of health under non-observability has two important 
consequences. One is that the introduction of insurance causes a fall in aggregate labor supply 
and hence production, the other is that concavity of consumption utility is not sufficient for 
insurance to be warranted. Both of these consequences follow from the fact that in our model, 
the individual makes a trade-off between the disutility of working and the utility loss of 
reduced consumption when living on benefits rather than on work. Since insurance mitigates 
the fall in consumption, it introduces a tax wedge p + b, which is the source of the fall in 
aggregate labor supply. By contrast, in the binary model such a trade-off is not possible since 
the disutility of work is infinite for a sick individual. Therefore, aggregate labor supply in the 
binary model is a step function (either all healthy individuals work, or no one works). In this 
sense, the tax wedge p + b does not bite in that model, while in our model, labor supply is 
continuous and the tax wedge does have an effect. 
 
4.3 Administrative Rejection of Claims 
In the absence of administrative rejection of claims, an incentive-compatible insurance 
contract means that the individual himself can choose whether to live on work or on benefits. 
This might seem to be quite an odd insurance contract, but it is a logical consequence of the 
assumption that θ  is unobservable for the insurer. Indeed, until recently, sick-pay insurance 
in some countries has functioned in approximately this way because the authorities have been 
reluctant to reject individual claims. The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have been 
conspicuous examples in this respect. However, in other countries – and recently also in the 
above-mentioned countries – the insurer does in fact reject some benefit claims.  
 
We now turn to the question of whether such rejection may increase expected utility. One 
reason why this may be the case is that the optimal contract implies less than full insurance 
() 1 ( ' ) ( ' N N p u b u − > ) and that, therefore, more income smoothing could be achieved by 
transferring some income from workers to beneficiaries. However, even though the benefits 
for all beneficiaries cannot be increased without weakening the incentives to work, would it 
be possible to improve expected utility by increasing benefits for some of them at the expense 
of others? Because θ  is not observable, such redistribution must be based on a random 
selection of individuals. One way of accomplishing this is to apply a constant rejection rate, q, 
to benefit claims. 
   19
Random rejection of insurance claims may, of course, simply be regarded as a lottery. Like all 
lotteries, it violates the principle of horizontal equity, and it may therefore lack legitimacy 
among citizens and thus be politically infeasible.
 15 Nevertheless, such a lottery is worth 
studying. There are two main reasons for this. One is that rejection of claims is a common 
feature of real-world insurance systems.
16 The other reason is that the construction of 
insurance contracts is an application of the so-called “mechanism design” literature, where 
lotteries often play an important part. 
 
It turns out that the welfare consequences of introducing random rejection into insurance 
contracts depends crucially on whether an individual whose claim has been rejected can return 
to work or has to stay at home without benefits. As will be shown below (Proposition 6 (ii)), 
expected utility will always fall in the latter case. The intuition is simply that the individual 
will then be exposed to a higher income risk without any compensating gain. Let us therefore 
concentrate on the case where an individual whose claim has been rejected is able to go back 
to work after a rejection. To analyze this case, first note that total absence now consists of two 
components: those whose claims have been accepted and those who chose to stay at home 
even though their claims have been rejected: 
 
 ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
∗∗ ∗ ⋅ + ⋅ − = θ θ π F q F q ,     (18)
  
where 
∗ ∗ θ  is the cut-off at which the individual is indifferent between staying at home with no 
benefits and working:  ) 1 ( ) 0 ( p u u − − ≡





(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
(0) ( ) (1 ) ( ).
q EU u p dF q u b dF


















   (19) 
 
The first term represents individuals who go to work and do not apply for benefits. The next 
three terms represent those who applied for benefits. Among these, the second term in (19) 
                                                 
15 Presumably, the more elaborate the lottery, the more problematic it may be from the point of view of 
legitimacy. 
16 In the real world, an individual’s health state is partly observable rather than non-observable; cf. Section 5 
below.   20
refers to those whose claims were accepted, while the next terms represent those whose 
claims were rejected and who chose to stay home without benefits. The last term refers to 
those who, after having been rejected, chose to go back to work. 
 
We maximize expected utility with respect to p, b and q (recalling that 
∗ =θ θ ˆ  to achieve 
incentive compatibility) subject to the non-negativity constraints  0, 0 pb ≥≥  and to the 
budget constraint  
 







⋅+ − ⋅ − = ⎢⎥
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫∫ ∫.   (20) 
 
We denote the solution to this problem by  ) , ˆ , , ( q b p q q q q
∗ =θ θ . The first-order conditions are
17  
 
w.r.t. p:  
()
()
'(1 ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) '(1 )
u p dF q dF










−−⋅ + ≤ ⎢⎥
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(0) (1 ) ( ) 0.
pb u b u p d F









⋅+− − −− − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
−− − − − = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
∫
∫
     (23) 
 
As in the case without a rejection rate (Section 4.1), the first-order conditions imply 
'(1 ) '( ) qq up u b λ −< < , thereby illustrating the second-best character of the contract. By 
contrast to the case without rejection, we now have two different tax wedges:  q q b p +  for 
individuals who choose between working and applying for benefits, and  q p  for individuals 
                                                 
17 Equation (22) is identical to (15), and setting q = 0 in (21) yields (14). 
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who, after having been rejected, choose between working and staying at home without 
benefits. 
 
We cannot analytically determine whether q should be zero or positive in general. Therefore, 
we simulate the model numerically. For this purpose, we assume a utility function with 
constant relative risk aversion, i.e., 
1 () / ( 1 ) ux x
γ γ
− = − . For u(0) to be finite, we introduce an 
exogenous non-wage income, k. Consumption utility is now  ) 1 ( k p u + −  when working, 
) ( k b u +  when absent from work living and on benefits, and  ) (k u  when absent without 
benefits. The results of the simulations are reported in Figure 3 for a normal distribution 
) , ( ~ σ θ m N  of the taste parameter. The figure is based in the parameter values k = 0.25 and 
0 = m , but the results are qualitatively similar for a large set of values. Combinations of 
sigma and gamma for which q > 0 are located outside the convex set in the figure. 
 
 













Thus, our simulations prove that it is possible to find plausible parameter configurations for 
which a positive rejection rate is optimal.
18 The curve in the figure shows that for a given 
                                                 
18 By “plausible” we mean values that are of an order of magnitude similar to those observed in the real world. In 
the simulations reported in Figure 3, the absence rate  q π , as given by (18), varies between 0.2 and 0.25. This is 
a realistic figure for many European countries if both sick-pay insurance and disability pensions are included.   22
degree of risk aversion, the individual prefers a positive rejection rate for low values of the 
variance of θ . Intuitively speaking, the individual is willing to take the risk of having the 
claim rejected when the probability of very negative outcomes of θ  is small. As the variance 
increases, the individual will sooner or later be better off without a rejection rate.  
 
Hence, the simulations provide a numerical proof of part (i) in the following proposition; part 
(ii) can be proved analytically. 
 
Proposition 6:  
(i) If a rejected individual can return to work, a positive rejection rate q will increase the 
expected utility for some parameter constellations – in particular, when the variance of θ  
is small. 
(ii) If a rejected individual cannot return to work, a positive rejection rate q can never 
increase the expected utility. 
 
Proof of part (ii): See the Appendix. 
 
The reason a random rejection rate can increase expected utility is that rejected individuals 
may self-select between work and non-work. Such self-selection is conducive to allocative 
efficiency. Individuals with a relatively modest disutility of work will choose to return to 
work if rejected; this effect is accentuated by the fact that the tax wedge for rejected 
individuals is only  q p , rather than  q q b p + .  
 
Will the introduction of a rejection rate cause a production loss, as was the case without a 
rejection rate? The question is not trivial, since the cut-off with rejection,  ˆ
q θ , is not in general 
equal to the cut-off without rejection,  ˆ
N θ . However, the answer is unambiguous: 
 
Proposition 7: The introduction of insurance with a rejection rate q > 0 causes a fall in 
aggregate production. 
 
Proof: Everyone with a realization  ˆ () ( 1 ) qq q q ub u p θθ θ
∗ <== −−  will apply for benefits. If all 
these claims were accepted, the fall in labor supply (as compared to the case with no   23








∗ ∫ . However, a fraction q of these claims are rejected, 
and rejected individuals with realizations  (0) (1 ) q uu p θθ
∗∗ >= −− will go back to work, 








∗∗ ∗ − ∫∫ . Since 0 < q < 1 and  0 θ θ
∗ ∗∗ < , the first term in this expression is larger 
than the second term. Hence labor supply and production will fall.  Q. E. D. 
 
Thus, introducing insurance under non-observability will always cause a fall in average 
production – regardless of whether the insurance contract allows for a rejection rate q or not. 
Let us now ask whether optimal insurance with a rejection rate q is preferred to no insurance 
at all. It turns out that the following holds: 
 
Proposition 8: The conditions for insurance with a rejection rate to be desirable are the same 
as those for insurance without a rejection rate (Proposition 4), i.e., there must be some 
positive mass both below and above  0 θ
∗.  
 
Proof: The proof is parallel to that of Proposition 4. When proving Proposition 4, we showed 
that assuming a corner solution with p = b = 0 leads to a contradiction. The same holds in this 
case. Setting p = b = 0 in equations (21) and (22) yields  '(1) u λ ≤  and  '(0) u λ ≥  which cannot 
hold for a concave utility function. Thus the conditions for insurance with a rejection rate to 
be desirable are the same as for insurance without a rejection rate.  Q. E. D. 
 
Since we have assumed a given rejection rate q, we have limited our discussion to the special 
case of a lottery with only two outcomes (b and 0). Indeed, exactly this type of lottery is a 
feature of real-world insurance systems where rejection of claims is practiced. Generalizing 
the lottery to a large set of premium-benefit pairs – for instance,  11 (,) p b  with probability  1 q , 
22 (,) p b  with probability  2 q , etc. – may be a worthwhile area for future research.
 19 However, 
since our purpose here is not to provide a generalization of lotteries, but rather to study the 
                                                 
19 Here we only mention lotteries on payments p and b. Prescott and Townsend (1984) have discussed a binary 
insurance model where benefits b are deterministic, but with a lottery on how much an individual should work. 
In this paper, we do not deal with insurance involving lotteries on work assignments, because we do not consider 
such lotteries enforceable in a modern society with an open labor market.   24
consequences for insurance of a continuous health variable, we do not pursue such a 
generalization in this paper.   
 
As in the Diamond-Mirrlees binary treatment of θ , the moral-hazard problem is solved by 
imposing an incentive-compatibility constraint on the insurance contract. Thus, with an 
optimal insurance contract, no one has any incentive to misrepresent his θ . However, as we 
have seen before, the tax wedge p + b results in a fall in aggregate labor supply in the 
continuous model, but not in the binary one. Hence, while moral hazard is avoided, there is a 
tax-wedge effect in our model. This shows that moral hazard and tax wedges are not identical 
phenomena in insurance – although they are related. 
 
Since the incentive-compatibility constraint guarantees that there will be no cheating, we may 
say that there are no Type I errors: no one will receive benefits without having qualified. In 
this sense, moral hazard (= Type I errors) is ruled out in optimum. By contrast, a rejection rate 
q > 0 necessarily causes Type II errors: some individuals, who qualify to receive benefits, will 
not receive them. Nevertheless, as we have seen, for some parameter configurations, such a 
rejection rate may increase expected utility due to the self-selection to work among rejected 
individuals.
 20  
 
 
5. Partial Observability 
 
We now turn to the case where θ is partially observable. Clearly, this may be regarded as an 
intermediate case between the extreme assumptions of full observability and non-
observability. Moreover, it is probably the most realistic case. We assume that the insurer can 
observe a noisy signal  ε θ + ≡ s , where the noise ε  has a cumulative distribution function 
) (ε G with  ∞ < < ) var( 0 ε .
21 For simplicity, we assume that the stochastic variables θ  and ε  
are independently distributed. 
 
                                                 
20 In the standard binary model, a rejection rate can never increase expected utility since there is no heterogeneity 
among those who apply for benefits in the case of an optimum contract; they are all unable to work. 
21 This general formulation nests the informational setups in Sections 3 and 4. Under full observability, we 
would have  0 ) var( = ε , while in the case of non-observability, we would have  ∞ = ) var(ε .    25
We assume that the insurance contract is represented by a triplet  ˆ (,,) pbθ . In the following, 
we discuss two versions of this contract. In the first version, which is the most common type 
of income insurance in the real world, the individual receives the benefit b if two conditions 
are satisfied: the signal s is smaller than or equal to  ˆ θ , and the individual does not go to 
work. Symmetrically, the individual pays the premium p if s is greater than  ˆ θ  and the 
individual works. In the second type of contract, the benefit is conditioned only on the signal: 
the individual receives b if  ˆ s θ ≤ , regardless of whether he goes to work or not, and he pays p 
if  ˆ s θ > . While the first type of contract compensates the individual for income foregone, the 
second contract compensates for health problems that are experienced when working. 
 
Consider a particular individual, with a true health status θ . Let q denote the probability that 
this individual’s signal s exceeds the insurer’s cut-off:
22 
 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ Pr( ) Pr( ) 1 ( ) ( ) qs G q θ εθθ θθ θθ ≡> ≡> − ≡ −− ≡ − .   (24) 
 
Thus q is the probability that an applicant for benefits, with a true health state θ , will not 
receive any benefit. Since distribution functions are always non-decreasing, it follows that 
0 ) ˆ ( ' ≤ −θ θ q  and hence, q is a non-decreasing function of the true θ:  0 / ≥ ∂ ∂ θ q . This 
property has an intuitive appeal; an individual with severe health problems (i.e., a very low θ) 
is less likely to be denied benefits than an individual who is healthier.  
 
The error term ε  reflects two real-world phenomena. One is a simple error of measurement: 
the insurer (or the physician advising the insurer) misreads θ , and he is equally likely to 
overestimate as to underestimate it. Thus, if ε  were only a measurement error, it would be 
natural to assume that  () 0 E ε = . The other interpretation is that an individual has an incentive 
to exaggerate his health problem in order to increase the likelihood of receiving a benefit.
23 In 
such a case, the ε  resulting from an attempt by the individual to exaggerate his health 
                                                 
22 Thus, unlike in Section 4, q becomes endogenous and a function of θ . It may seem as if an endogenous 
rejection rate q can be derived only by complicated optimization procedures, such as the calculus of variation. 
However, (24) shows that the functional form of q is simply given by the distribution function G. 
23 In the absence of “mechanical” measurement errors, an individual with a true realization  ˆ θ θθ
∗ <<  will be 
tempted to exaggerate his health problems by emitting a signal  ˆ s θ < . In the presence of mechanical 
measurement errors, even an individual with  ˆ θ θ <  will have an incentive to try to look more sick than he 
actually is. The reason is that a positive measurement error might otherwise deprive him of his rightful benefit.   26
problems will be negative, and thus  () 0 E ε < . In the following analysis, we are agnostic as to 
the true nature of ε , and use a notation that encompasses both mechanisms. The probability 
distribution in (24) reflects the fact that someone is more likely to look sick, the sicker he 
actually is; this is indicated by the derivative  0 / ≥ ∂ ∂ θ q . 
 
5.1 Benefits Conditioned on the Signal and on Non-Work 
Let us start with the type of contract where payments are conditioned on the signal and the 
individual’s work decision. Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) studied a similar contract when 
asking whether to supplement ordinary retirement benefits (social security) with a relatively 
generous disability pension. They concluded that such a supplement is warranted under 
certain conditions.
24 In contrast to Diamond and Sheshinski, our purpose in this section is to 
investigate the general properties of a continuous insurance model under partial observability. 
As earlier, we study the consequences for aggregate labor supply of introducing optimal 
insurance, and we ask under what conditions (in addition to concavity) insurance is desirable. 
 
The insurer announces a cut-off  ˆ θ  according to which he is willing to honor a benefit claim if 
θ ˆ ≤ s  and the individual does not go to work. The individual observes his realization θ  and 
decides to apply for a benefit if  ( ) (1 ) ub u p θθ
∗ ≤≡ −−.  
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≡− + + − − +





                                                 
24 The conditions are the following. (i) That the probability of receiving the supplementary benefit falls with the 
individual’s state of health. This condition is similar to the property of our model, i.e. that  /0 q θ ∂∂ > . 
(However, as we have shown in Section 4.3, introducing rejection into our model can create a welfare gain due 
to self-selection even if q is constant, i.e., if  /0 q θ ∂ ∂=). (ii) That the marginal utility of consumption when 
living on benefits is higher than the marginal utility of consumption when living on labor income, in the special 
case where the consumption utility levels are the same in both situations. The intuition for the latter condition is 
not obvious. However, it is similar to the condition for a moral-hazard problem to emerge in the binary model of 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978). 
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where (0) (1 ) uu p θ
∗∗ ≡− − . The four integrals in the expression represent the following four 
groups of individuals: those who do not apply for benefits, those who apply and whose claims 
are accepted, rejected applicants who decide to stay home without benefits, and rejected 
applicants who decide to go back to work. The insurer’s budget constraint is 
 
  () ˆˆ () ( ) () 1 ( ) () 0 pd F q d F b q d F
θθ
θθ
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and the first-order conditions are 
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w. r. t. θ ˆ:  
()
()
ˆ () ( ) ( 1 ) ' () ( )
ˆ (0) (1 ) '( ) ( ) 0.
pb u b u p q d F
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   (27) 
 
Equations (25)-(26) imply that  '( ) '(1 ) PP ub u p λ >> − . This means that the contract 
ˆ (,,) PPP pbθ  is second-best, just as in the case of non-observability with a constant q.
25 
However, there are two main differences between these two cases. First, while the 
                                                 
25 The expression for total absence from work in society is now a generalization of (18): 
 
  () ˆˆ 1( )( ) ( ) ( )
PP
P qf d q f d
θθ
π θθ θθ θθ θθ
∗∗ ∗
−∞ −∞
=− − + − ∫∫     
where, as previously,  (0) (1 ) P P uu p θ
∗ ≡− − .    28
individual’s preferred cut-off  q θ
∗ is identical to the insurer’s cut-off  ˆ
q θ  in the case of a non-
observable θ  and a constant q (to guarantee incentive compatibility),  () ( 1 ) PP P ub u p θ
∗ =− −  is 
in general not equal to  ˆ
P θ . In this respect, the case of partial observability is similar to the 
case of full observability: there is no incentive-compatibility constraint in the optimization. 
Second, there will be a more efficient allocation between work and non-work among 
claimants, since individuals with very low realizations of θ are less likely than others to be 
rejected in the case of an endogenous q than if q were constant. Thus, among individuals who 
apply for benefits, those with relatively less discomfort from working are more likely to be 
rejected, and go back to work, than others. The reason is that in addition to self-selection, 
there will be an administrative selection: individuals with a relatively bad outcome of the θ 
variable will be favored by the lottery. Hardly surprisingly, we obtain a more efficient 
selection of individuals between work and non-work if health is partially observable.  
 
As in the preceding sections, we also ask how the introduction of insurance in an economy 
with partial observability affects aggregate labor supply and hence production. We have the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 9: If payments are conditioned on both the signal and the individual’s work 
decision, the introduction of insurance causes a fall in aggregate production, as compared to 
the case with no insurance at all. 
 
The proof is, in principle, the same as in the case of a constant q (Proposition 7) and is left out 
here. We also have 
 
Proposition 10: When payments are conditioned on both the signal and the work decision, the 
conditions for insurance to be desirable are the same as in Propositions 5 and 8, namely that 
there must be some positive mass both below and above  0 θ
∗.  
 
This can be proved by contradiction in the same way as Proposition 8. Let p and b go to zero 
in the first-order conditions (25)-(26), expressed as weak inequalities () ≤ . Provided that   29




While there is no moral hazard (in the sense of Type 1 errors) in the case of an optimal 
contract under non-observability, moral hazard may arise under partial observability with the 
type of contract discussed in this section: some (lucky) individuals will receive benefits even 
though their actual health status θ  would not qualify them. This holds for individuals whose 
signals are smaller than the insurer’s cut-off (i.e.,  θ ˆ < s ) at the same time as their actual θ  is 
larger than   ˆ θ . Such individuals appear sick in the eyes of the insurer, although in reality they 
are quite healthy. There will also be Type II errors; for some realizations of the disturbance, 
the individual looks healthy in the eyes of the insurer – although he is in fact sick. Thus, under 
partial observability, there will be both Type I and Type II errors.  
 
 
5.2 Payments Tied to the Signal Only 
Let us now look at a different type of contract under partial observability, where the payments 
are tied only to the individual’s signal s θ ε = + , regardless of his work decision. As above, 
we assume that the contract is established before the actual realization of θ . If  θ ˆ ≤ s , the 
individual receives a benefit b from the insurer.
27 Similarly, if  ˆ s θ > , the individual pays a 
premium p to the insurer.
28 The probability that the individual has to pay p to the insurer is 
ˆ () q θ θ − , given by (24), and the probability that he will receive b from the insurer is 
ˆ 1( ) q θ θ −− . Since payments between the insurer and the insurer are not contingent on work 
decisions, all individuals in the population participate in the “lottery” defined by the 
probability q. After the payments have been determined, the individual decides whether or not 
to go to work. 
 
This type of contract might seem unrealistic. However, it may make sense if the variance of ε  
is very small. An example is workers’ compensation for work injuries. Other examples are 
                                                 
26 The reason why q = 1 is excluded by assumption is that there would in fact be no insurance if the claims were 
always rejected. 
27 This type of contract can be regarded as an insurance contract, and not just any type of lottery, because the 
probability that an individual will receive a benefit b increases with the severity of his health effects. 
28 Note that there is no problem of enforceability in this case, since the contract refers only to payments of 
money, and not to work assignments.   30
serious diseases for which the signal is quite precise, for instance, heart failure, cancer and 
diabetes. Indeed, in the case of work injuries, payments in the real world are often tied to the 
signal of the injury – independently of whether the individual chooses to work or not. An 
advantage of not tying the benefits to an individual’s work decision is that a tax wedge is 
thereby avoided, although the signal does not provide perfect information about the 
individual’s ability to work.  
 
As in earlier sections, we ask two basic questions. First, is the individual’s labor supply 
affected by the introduction of such insurance? Second, is such insurance desirable as 
compared to no insurance at all? We also consider a third question: could an insurance 
contract of this type be preferable to a more traditional insurance contract of the type analyzed 
in Section 5.1? 
 
Let us first study what an optimal contract would look like, provided an interior solution is 
desirable. All individuals now participate in the lottery  ˆ () q θ θ − , while in Section 5.1 only 
those with θ θ
∗ ≤  did so. As a result, an individual’s income will depend on two factors: the 
outcome of the lottery, and the individual’s work decision after realization of the lottery. If he 
is lucky in the lottery, his income will be either 1 + b or b, depending on whether or not he 
chooses to work. If unlucky, his income will instead be 1 – p or –p.  
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where  () ( 1 ) ub u b θ ≡− + %  is the cut-off between non-work and work for individuals with luck 
in the lottery, while  ( ) (1 ) upu p θ ≡ −− − % %  is the corresponding cut-off for individuals with bad 
luck. It follows from concavity that θ θ < % %% . The four integrals in the EU function represent the 
following four groups of individuals: those who are lucky in the lottery and choose to work,   31
those who are lucky and choose not to work, those who are unlucky in the lottery and choose 
to work, and those who are unlucky and choose not to work.
29 The budget constraint is 
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and the first-order conditions with respect to p and b can be written 
 
'(1 ) (1 ) '( ) up u p α αλ ⋅− + − ⋅ − ≥ ,       (28) 
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Note that the first-order conditions (28) and (29) look similar to the first-order conditions (5') 
for the case of full observability. In (28), α  may be interpreted as the fraction of those who 
were unlucky in the lottery and choose to work. Similarly, β  in (29) may be interpreted as the 
fraction of those who were lucky in the lottery and choose to work. Condition (28) thus says 
that in an interior optimum, the average marginal utility of those who were unlucky in the 
lottery is equal to the social value of resources. Equation (29) gives the corresponding 
condition for those who were lucky in the lottery. The only difference from the marginal 
conditions under full observability (5') is that the marginal utilities are now expressed in terms 
of averages.
30  
                                                 
29 As pointed out in Section 3, an optimal contract under full observability would never allow a person to receive 
an income 1 + b or –p. However, such outcomes are possible in an optimal contract under partial observability. 
30 If all those who have been denied benefits choose to go back to work, i.e., if  1 α = , equation (28) collapses to 
the first condition in (5'). Similarly, if all those who have been awarded benefits choose to stay home, i.e., if   32
 
The first-order condition with respect to  ˆ θ  is: 
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  (30) 
 
Equations (28)-(30) define the optimal insurance contract  ˆ (,,)
s ss
PPP pbθ ; the superscript “s” in 
the triplet indicates that payments in this contract are tied only to the signal. We have 
 
Proposition 11: If there is an interior solution to (28)-(30), it is characterized by less than full 
insurance: 1
s s
P P p b −> . 
 
Proof: With an interior solution, (28)-(29) are satisfied as equalities, implying that the 
weighted average of  '(1 )
s
P up −  and  '( )
s
P up −  should be equal to the weighted average of 
'(1 )
s
P ub +  and  '( )
s
P ub . Since  '( ) '(1 )
s s
PP up u b −>+, the two weighted averages can be equal 
only if  '( ) '(1 )
s s
PP ub u p >−, i.e., only if 1
s s
P P p b − > .  Q. E. D. 
 
Let us now return to the same issues raised in the previous sections, namely the effects on 
labor supply of introducing insurance, and whether insurance is desirable at all. Concerning 
labor supply, we have 
 
Proposition 12: If payments are conditioned only on the signal, the effect on labor supply of 
introducing insurance is ambiguous. 
 
Proof:  The introduction of insurance will induce some individuals with a lucky outcome to 
choose to stay home from work even though they would have gone to work in the absence of 
a lottery. These individuals will reduce their labor supply. The number of such individuals is 
                                                                                                                                                          
0 β = , equation (29) collapses to the second condition in (5'). This shows the close similarity between the full 
observability case and the partial observability case where payments are tied only to the signal. In the former 
case, the optimal contract implies that all those who have been awarded benefits (i.e., all those with  ˆ
F θ θ ≤ ) 
choose to stay home, while all those who are denied benefits (i.e., all those with  ˆ







. Similarly, a number of individuals with a bad outcome in θ  and bad luck in the 
lottery will choose to work, even though they would have stayed home in the absence of 





















.  Q. E. D. 
 
Concerning desirability, there are still two questions. One is whether insurance based only on 
the signal is desirable as compared to no insurance at all. The other question is under what 
conditions such insurance is more favorable than an insurance based on both the signal and 
the individual’s work decision (Section 5.1). As for the first question we have  
 
Proposition 13: A necessary condition for insurance based only on the signal s to be desirable 
is that there must be some mass between θ % %  and θ% . This condition is satisfied if there is some 
mass around  0 θ
∗. 
 
Proof: First we note that  0 θ θθ
∗ << % %% . Assume that all mass of the distribution is to the right of  
θ% . Then every one will always work, regardless of the outcome of the lottery. The lottery 
would thus only cause variability in income, and would therefore be undesirable to a risk-
averse individual. Thus  lower θ θ < %  is a necessary condition for the lottery to be desirable. 
Assume now that all mass of the distribution is to the left of θ % % . Then no one would ever 
work. In such a case, the lottery would only cause income variability, which is undesirable. 
Hence  upper θ θ > % %  is also a necessary condition for the lottery to be desirable. These two 
conditions  combined imply that some mass between θ % %  and θ%  is necessary for the lottery to 
be desirable. Since  0 θ θθ
∗ < < % %% , some mass around  0 θ
∗ is sufficient for this to occur.
  Q. E. D. 
 
Could the type of contract discussed in this section be preferable to the type of contract 
discussed in Section 5.1, where the payment is conditional on both the signal and the work 
decision? The advantage of a contract based only on the signal is that it does not create any   34
tax wedge; in this sense, it resembles a contract of full observability. The disadvantage is that 
the contract  ˆ (,,)
s ss
PPP pbθ  increases the dispersion of disposable income; some individuals will 
get a double income of 1 + b, while others will receive a negative income of –p. Heuristically, 
we would expect this disadvantage to be small if the variance of the disturbance term ε  is 
small; indeed, if  0 ε σ → , we will obtain the first-best insurance contract available in the case 
of full observability. 
 
Figure 4: The region in  ) , ( ε σ σ  space where the contract of Section 5.2 
(payment conditioned on signal only) yields a higher expected utility than the 
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To illustrate the relative merits of the contracts of Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we have carried out 
simulations of the two models. Figure 4 shows combinations of σ  and  ε σ  for which one 
contract dominates the other. We have assumed that  ~( 0 ,) N θ σ  and  ~( 0 ,) N ε ε σ , that k = 
0.25 and that  2 γ = . For all combinations of σ  and  ε σ  below the solid curve, the contract 
based only on the signal yields the highest expected utility, while for all combination above   35
the curve, the contract based on both the signal and the work decision (Section 5.1) yields the 
highest utility. 
 
As in the contract analyzed in Section 5.1, there will be both Type I and Type II errors with a 
contract conditioned on the signal only. A few healthy people will enjoy a double income 1 + 
b (Type I errors) while a few really sick persons will have to survive on an income –p (Type 
II errors). Nevertheless, as indicated by the simulation, such a contract may generate higher 
expected utility than the contract of Section 5.1, provided the variance of ε  is sufficiently 
small. The reason is that it does not create any distortionary tax wedge; for some parameter 
configurations, this may compensate for the wider range of income. Thus, the simulations are 
consistent with our intuition that a contract based only on the signal is preferable for low 
values of  ε σ . 
 
 
6.  Social Norms 
 
So far, we have analyzed how traditional economic factors, such as prices (p and b) and 
rationing (administrative rejection), affect the utilization of income insurance. However, in 
reality, the functioning of income insurance also depends on social norms concerning the 
utilization of the benefit system. Our model turns out to be well suited for incorporating such 
considerations into the analysis. To clarify this issue in the simplest possible way, we return 
to the model of non-observability, without a rejection rate q.  
 
A straightforward way of incorporating social norms into our model is to add a 
“stigmatization variable”  0 ≥ φ  to the individual’s utility when he is absent from work: 
()
a uu b φ ≡− . (In principle, we follow the formalization of the role of social norms for benefit 
dependency in Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 1999.
31) One possibility is to regard the norm 
as a constant:  φ φ ≡ , i. e., as exogenous (for instance, inherited from the past). Another 
possibility is to treat norms as endogenous: when a large number of individuals are absent 
from work, absence is likely to be more legitimate than if only a few individuals are absent. 
                                                 
31 See Moffitt (1983) for an early analysis of the stigmatization due to living on welfare payments. Brock and 
Durlauf (2001) give a systematic discussion of alternative ways of specifying various types of social interaction 
among individuals, including the role of social norms.    36
Hence, when the norm is endogenous, we have  ) (π φ φ ≡  with  0 / < ∂ ∂ π φ , where π  stands 
for the average absence rate in society.
  
 
The individual’s cut-off point in the presence of norms,  norm θ
∗ , is the value of θ  for which 
φ θ − = + − ) ( ) 1 ( b u p u : 
 
  










     (31) 
 
where  N θ
∗  is the same cut-off point as in a non-observability model without social norms (13). 
From (31) it follows that norms reduce the cut-off point:  norm θ θ
∗ ∗ ≤ . Since the individual 
chooses to stay home whenever  norm θ θ
∗ ≤ , his absence rate with norms is 
()( )( ) norm norm N N N FF F π θθ φ θ π
∗∗ ∗ == − ≤ = , hence lower than without norms.  
 
In the case of exogenous norms, with  φ φ = , the absence rate can be written on closed form:  
 
() ex N F π θφ
∗ =− .       (32) 
 
In the case of endogenous norms, we instead have  ( ) () end N F π θφ π
∗ =−. Since the average 
absence rate π  is the same as the absence rate  end π of the representative individual, we may 
write 
 
  ( ) () end N end F πθ φ π
∗ =− .     (33) 
 
The right-hand side of (33) is increasing in  end π  and may be non-linear. The equation may 
therefore have multiple solutions, as is often the case in models of social interaction. Hence, 
there may be several alternative absence rates (for a given insurance system) in a society with 
endogenous social norms.  
   37
We achieve a particularly simple analysis by considering a linear version of the model, 
assuming θ  to be uniformly distributed on  , θ σθ σ ⎡ ⎤ −+ ⎣ ⎦ . For the case of endogenous 
norms, we further assume the linear stigmatization function  ( ) (1 ) end end φ πγ π ≡ ⋅− , where γ  is 
a positive constant. With these functional forms, we obtain the following simple expressions 


































These three expressions give us the expression for absence,  ˆ () F π θ = , for the special case of 
a uniform distribution and a linear stigmatization function. Since  end π  is non-negative, 2σ γ −  
must be greater than zero. Substituting the expression for π  into the last two functions, we 
















.     (35) 
  
We may summarize the properties of our linear model in the form of the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 14:   
(i)  The absence level is lower with than without norms.    38
(ii)  Parameter changes in the insurance system (i.e., in p or b) will have the same 
effect on the aggregate absence rate in the case of exogenous norms as without 
norms.
32 
(iii)  Parameter changes in the insurance system (in p or b for instance) will result in 
larger changes in aggregate absence in the case of endogenous norms than with 
exogenous norms or no norms at all. In other words, endogenous norms create a 
“social multiplier” as defined by Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003). 
 
Proof: These properties immediately follow from our previous analysis. 
 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we have a developed a model of income insurance to highlight several real-
world features that are not reflected in the traditional, binary model. Our model yields a 
number of insights concerning the purpose and consequences of income insurance.  
 
To begin with, it turns out that concavity of consumption utility is not sufficient for insurance 
to be desirable. The reason is that if an individual’s ability and willingness to work is 
regarded as a continuous variable, introducing optimal insurance will in general have an 
impact on aggregate production. This change in production should be evaluated against the 
advantages of insurance. By contrast, in the insurance literature pioneered by Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1978), where the individual’s health is treated as a binary variable, there is no effect 
on production of introducing an optimal insurance system: everyone who is sick stays home 
and everyone who is healthy goes to work, just as they would if there were no insurance at all. 
This means that there is no change in production to be evaluated against the advantages of 
having insurance. Therefore, in the binary model, concavity of utility is sufficient for 
insurance to be desirable, while in our model, it is not. 
 
                                                 
32 This result relies on our simplifying assumption of a rectangular distribution  ) (θ F . Let us denote a parameter 
in the insurance system by x. For an arbitrary distribution,  // ex x x π π ∂ ∂< ∂ ∂  iff  () ( ) N N ff θ φθ
∗∗ −< . A 
sufficient condition for this to hold is that both cut-offs  ex θ
∗  and 
∗ θ  are located on the upward-sloping part of 
the density function  ) (θ f .   39
The mechanisms behind the effect of insurance on aggregate production differ depending on 
what is assumed about the observability of an individual’s health. Under full observability the 
change in production could be either positive or negative, and is solely due to an income 
effect. The reason is that there is no tax wedge and no moral hazard problem in this case. By 
contrast, under non-observability, there is a moral-hazard problem which is solved by 
imposing incentive compatibility, as in the traditional, binary theory. Thus, there is no moral 
hazard in optimum: nobody will have an incentive to exaggerate his discomfort from working.  
 
Under non-observability, the consequences for production are caused by a tax-wedge effect, 
and production will unambiguously fall if insurance is introduced under. In this case, of 
course, administrative rejection has to be purely random. Nevertheless, such rejection may 
increase expected utility for some parameter constellations. The intuition is that if some 
claims are rejected, it is possible to raise the benefit level for others without harming work 
incentives. Moreover, rejected individuals tend to self-select in the sense that those with a 
relatively low discomfort from working choose to go back to work. Such self-selection cannot 
occur in a binary model. 
 
With partial observability, it is useful to distinguish between two types of contract. In one, the 
payments between the insurer and the insured are conditioned both on a noisy signal of the 
individual’s health and on his decision whether or not to go to work. The insurer uses this 
noisy signal as a basis for rejecting claims. Since the signal gives at least some information 
about the individual’s health, rejections will be better targeted than in the case of non-
observability: individuals with relatively good health will be rejected more often than others. 
In this case as well, it turns out that the introduction of insurance will cause an unambiguous 
fall in aggregate labor supply because there is a tax wedge (as in the case of non-
observability). The other type of contract under partial observability implies that payments are 
conditioned on a noisy signal only. Such a contract will not give rise to any tax wedge (as 
under full observability) and the effect on labor supply of introducing optimal insurance is 
indeterminate.  
 
With both types of contract under partial observability, moral hazard will be present in 
optimum: some individuals will have an incentive to exaggerate their discomfort from work, 
and may receive benefits without qualifying. We have called this Type I errors. There will   40
also be Type II errors in the sense that some individuals will be denied benefits even though 
they qualify for them. 
 
Our general approach, with health regarded as a continuous variable, is also conducive to 
analyzing the role of social norms for the functioning of income insurance. While exogenous 
social norms, inherited from the past, tend to mitigate moral hazard, endogenous norms may 
accentuate it. The model permits a simple derivation of a social multiplier for the case of 
endogenous norms. 
 
The model can be extended in various ways. One possibility could be to modify the model in 
order to include part-time benefits. Such a system creates incentives for individuals to shift 
from full-time benefits and full-time work to part-time benefits. The net effect of such a 
system on total work absence, as compared to a system that only allows for full-time benefits, 
is worth investigating. Another extension might be to include the effects on production of so-
called “presenteeism”, i.e., a situation where individuals go to work even when they have 
health problems that may reduce the labor productivity of their coworkers (an externality), or 
that may endanger their own future health (myopia or lack of information).
33 Finally, the 
model could be modified to address problems related to ex ante moral hazard, i.e., behavioral 
adjustment by the individual before a random health shock has been realized (for instance, 
when the insured individual chooses a less prudent lifestyle). In our framework, ex ante moral 
hazard can be analyzed as a situation where the introduction of insurance affects the 
probability distribution of the health shock. 
 
                                                 
33 See, for instance, Chatterji and Tilley (2002).   41
Appendix: Proof of Part (ii) in Proposition 6 
 
Assume that an individual whose claim has been rejected has no other choice than to stay at 
home without any benefits. The cut-off at which the individual is indifferent between working 
and applying for benefits (and run the risk of risk being rejected) is 
 
  (1 ) ( ) (0) (1 ) X qub q u u p θ
∗ =− + − − . 
 
The Langrangean in this case is 
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This gives the following first-order conditions: 
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From the f. o. c. w. r. t. b, we solve out the expression for [ ] (1 ) ( ) X pq b f λ θ
∗ +−  and substitute 
it into the expression for  / L q ∂∂ . After some re-arranging, we obtain 
 
  () sgn sgn '( ) ( ) (0)
L
bu b u b u
q
∂
=− − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∂
 
 
which, by concavity, is negative. Thus, there is no interior solution with respect to q in this 
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